0 9569 9577 9583 9587 9593 9595 9599 9605 9607 9613 9619 9623 9625 9629 9635 9637 9643 9647 9649 9653 9655 9659 9661 9663 9664 9665 9667 9668 9669 9671 9673 9677 9679 9683 9685 9689 9695 9697 9703 9707 9709 9713 9719 9725 9727 9733 9737 9739 9745 9749 9755 9763 11751 wht do u want from here 山西特色农产品北京展销周民间工艺展区 你在开玩笑吧？ invlidos I just have a corner. You cannot go in, I also walk not to come out. 你要配合我也说英语 elia i will send to u Economists have traditionaly found choice to be unambiguously good. The idea is simple: as the choice set gets larger, consumers cannot be worse off, because at worst extra choices become irrelevant. Better yet if the choices are produced without bene?t of government subsidies. Because of this, economists tend to look a such innovations as subprime mortgages as welfare improving. Many commentators have expressed this view, including former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, who noted in testimony: ‘‘where once marginal applicants would have simply been denied credit, lenders are now able to quite ef?- ciently judge the risk posed by individuals and price that risk appropriately... ...Improved access to credit for consumers, and especially these more-recent developments, has had signi?cant bene?ts. Unquestionably, innovation and deregulation have vastly expanded credit availability to virtually all income classes. Access to credit has enabled families to purchase homes, deal with emergencies, and obtain goods and services. Home ownership is at a record high, andthe number of home mortgage loans to low- andmoderate-income and minority families has risen rapidly over the past ?ve years. Credit cards and installment loans are also available to the vast majority of households More recently, however, behavioral economics has been exploring the fact that agents do have limited capacity to process information, and can therefore wind up worse off when confronted with two many choices. Market failure, moreover, is not controversial within economics for existence, but rather for the appropriate policy response to it. We now know that the subprime market presented consum- 是你的女儿 你是伟人 就不要羞辱我了 好吗？ 和父母过一个开心的新年 自燃 lgsetupwizard we are celebrate happy new year you see , a lot of vegetables and chick on the table 一千零一颗星星 实施基础 犯贱也要有限度 护患关系更融洽了， 如果无发再念你的名字，我就失去了声音 公共课规范化 And what is your wish?The spirit of the jungles asked him. i'm hearin what you say but i just can't make a sound part of the body 一千零一幅油画 你不了解中国人生活的困境 降价空间给哥哥哥哥哥哥 行了 你有能力 我闭嘴 我的内心像梦一样，过去了就让它过去吧。 Discard configuration changes and exit now 我很感谢你 when my son，Mark，was in the third grade ,he saved all his pocket money for over three months to buy holiday presents.the third Saturday in December Mark said he had made his list and twenty dollars in his pocket. 余uyuuyi multiple set of problems that need to be addressed. The asymmetric information problems ?ow between borrowers and brokers, aggregators and rating agencies, and investors and issuers. Along with these classic market failure issues, increasing competiveness in the mortgage market may have aggravated these problems. All this said, it remains possible that the subprime market increased homeownership on net in the United States, at least for the consensus default rates expected. But it is not necessarily the case that the expansion of homeowning implies that the subprime market was welfare improving. This paper has two parts. First, we look at the various agents involved in the mortgage transaction—including borrowers, brokers, originators, and investors—and their incentives. These incentives may help reveal how the subprime crisis became so large, and inform the appropriate policy responses going forward. 2. Agents and their incentives 2.1. Borrowers—Heterogeneous Within the realm of the traditional conventional-conforming market, borrowers are relatively homogenous in terms of down-payments and credit scores as measured by FICO. Any variations tend to result in modest differences in default and prepayment probabilities that are reasonably well understood by the market. This is why traditional conforming mortgages may be placed into pools that sell as commodities in a very liquid securities market. In contrast, jumbo loans are tranched for credit. The Government Sponsored Enterprises’ (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) ability to provide a corporate guarantee replaces this credit tranching to provide liquidity for the conforming market. The market performs fairly close to a market with complete information. The reason for this is that conforming, prime mortgages are highly standardized: borrowers ?ll out a standardized loan application, appraisers use a standardized appraisal form, and borrowers provided standardized documentation for income and assets. Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold or guarantee millions of loans, they effectively have a large data set with which to calibrate models of mortgage default. The GSEs use econometric models to estimate a probability functions; a general form of this function is P(d|X,H), where X is a set of explanatory variables and H is a set of parameters that maps the Xs to delinquency and default probabilities. If the model is well speci?ed, and the Xs have large explanatory power, it is dif?cult for borrowers to have an information advantage over lenders: the distribution of unobserved characteristics of borrowers will wither be small or irrelevant. One of the things that allowed the
